Buford's Defense in Depth at Gettysburg

Buford's Defense in Depth at Gettysburg

The concept that John Buford employed in the initial defense of Gettysburg is called a "defense in depth". The theory behind a defense in depth is for the defending force to select a position far from the point that it ultimately wants to defend, so that there is a place to fall back to. A delaying action is fought, with the idea of slowly making a fighting withdrawal. The defending force makes use of the terrain to delay the enemy's advance.

Buford recognized the good high ground to the south and east of the town square and elected to fight a defense in depth to hold it until the infantry could come up. Buford had been consulting with John Reynolds in Emmitsburg on the way to Gettysburg on June 30, and knew how close the infantry was. He would defend the town from the west and north. Gamble on the west side, and Devin on the north.

Buford set up his videttes on an arc seven miles long. Gamble's farthest post was four miles from the town square, Devin's six. The idea of videttes is to serve as an early warning system. They make contact with the enemy, fire warning shots, delay as long a possible, and then fall back to the next chosen defensive position. Gamble covered an arc from the Fairfield Road to the Mummasburg Road. Devin covered the Carlisle, Harrisburg and York Roads. The next fall back position from the west was Herr's Ridge (which combines with Belmont School House Ridge), and then finally, the main line of battle was atop McPherson Ridge.

The vidette line of Gamble's brigade was manned by about 275 men. The farthest post was atop Knoxlyn Ridge at the Whisler blacksmith shop. Vidette posts were typically manned by three or four men, and commanded by a non-com. This particular one was commanded by Sgt. Levi Shaffer of the 8th Illinois Cavalry. Lt. Marcellus Jones of the 8th Illinois commanded the regiment's vidette line. Early on the morning of July 1, Sgt. Shaffer spotted billowing clouds of dust arising along the Chambersburg Pike, indicating the movement of a large body of men. Shaffer called for Jones. Jones watched for a moment, borrowed Shaffer's Sharps carbine, rested it on a fence post, and squeezed off the first shot of the Battle of Gettysburg. Fired at a range of about 700 yards, it hit nothing. Instead, it sent up the alarm among Heth's advancing infantry. Soon, more shots rang out along the vidette line. It was about 6 a.m. Word was sent back to Buford to let him know that the Confederates had begun to advance. While he sent for Calef's artillery, the surprised Confederates stopped and began to deploy into line of battle, a process that took nearly two full hours. Just by firing a few shots that hit nothing, Buford bought two hours' time. In the meantime, Buford sent messengers to Reynolds to try to hurry the infantry to Gettysburg.

In the meantime, the videttes fell back to Herr's Ridge. There, along with about 500 others of Gamble's brigade (total strength, about 750), they made a stand for the better part of an hour. Remember, too, that effective strength had to be reduced by 25% due to the fact that one in every four men was given task of holding horses. So, the actual strength was about 450. They stood there for about 45 minutes. Meanwhile, Calef's three sections of artillery deployed along McPherson's Ridge. Two sections (4 guns) deployed on the Chambersburg Pike and the other two about four hundred yards away, near the spot where Reynolds fell. The idea was to disperse the guns to create the illusion that Buford actually had more than 6 pieces of artillery at his disposal.

The Confederates, after driving Gamble off Herr's Ridge, then got caught in the valley created by Willoughby Run. They came under heavy fire there, and it took time for them to regroup and begin to advance up the western slope of McPherson's Ridge. By this time, it was nearly 9:15. Buford had already bought more than three hours' time by his stand. However, he grew worried, as there was still no sign of the advance of Reynolds' infantry. He went up the cupola of the Seminary to search for the head of Reynolds' column, worried--he realized that it was just a matter of time before he had to pull back or he ran out of ammo. As McPherson's Ridge was the chosen spot for the defensive stand, Buford deployed all of Gamble's brigade there, as well as a regiment of Devin's, positioned to the north of the railroad cut. There, they stood for about an hour before the Confederates began pressing them back, both by flanking the position and because Gamble's men were running out of ammunition.

As things looked most desperate, Buford's signal officer, Lt. Aaron B. Jerome, spotted the advance of Reynolds' column, and reported it to Buford. Buford ascended the cupola again, saw it himself, and said, "Good, now we can hold the place." He sent a messenger to Reynolds, who spurred ahead to meet with Buford. Reynolds called out, "What goes, John?" Buford characteristically replied, "The Devil's to pay!" and pointed out the advancing Confederate infantry. Reynolds then asked whether Buford could hold, to which the cavalryman responded, "I reckon so." Buford then came down, and he and Reynolds conferred and rode out to the front to see the situation.

Reynolds then sent his staff officer, Capt. Stephen Minot Weld, to Meade with a situation report, wherein Reynolds said, "Tell the General that we will hold the heights to the south of the town, and that I will barricade the streets of the town if necessary." Weld rode off to report. In the meantime, Reynolds gave orders for his infantry, led by Doubleday's division, to come up at the double-quick, which they did, advancing across the fields on the oblique. As Gamble's men were running out of ammunition, the infantry came up, and Gamble's tired troopers opened ranks to make room for them to come into line. After being relieved, Gamble's troopers took up a position on the Union left. The men of the 3rd Indiana Cavalry refused to leave the line of battle, holding a position next to the Iron Brigade. Meanwhile, Joe Davis was pressing Devin back. Since Devin had only a regiment and a half atop the ridge, their position was more desperate. Reynolds responded by calling up John Robinson's division, which arrived just in the nick of time, just before Devin's guys ran out of ammunition.

This was a perfectly planned and perfectly executed defense in depth, executed with perfect dragoon tactics. If one reads the manual for this sort of thing, what Buford did was by the letter of the book.

Eric J. Wittenberg
Columbus, Ohio
www.rushslancers.com

Guns At Gettysburg

3.8-inch James Rifle. The James Rifle was a bronze rifle similar in shape to the 3-inch Ordnance Rifle, and was produced by the Ames Manufacturing Company of Chicopee, Massachusetts. It was not a widely used cannon in either army, though the 2nd Connecticut Battery was armed them at Gettysburg. The James Rifle fired a 14-pound elongated shell and were accurate up to 1,700 yards.

2.75-inch Whitworth Rifle. Imported from England by both North and South, only the Confederacy actively used these unique guns in the field. Designed by Sir Joseph Whitworth before the American Civil War, it fired an elongated 12-pound iron shell which fit snuggly into the fine rifling of the tube. It was also unusual in that it was a breechloader. A locking ring around the breech allowed the end of the gun to be opened so that the shell and powder charge could be loaded through the breech. The gun's unusual shape and distinctive shells were a curiosity when compared to other ordnance, though they were extremely accurate and could fire a solid shot beyond 2,800 yards. Two of the guns were in use by Hurt's Alabama Battery at Gettysburg and the shrill whine of the Whitworth shells was distinguishable above the roar of the cannonade before Pickett's Charge. Though the Whitworth cannon was very accurate, it had a myriad of problems with the breech mechanism. According to Colonel E.P. Alexander, the Whitworth was not as desirable a weapon as the 3-inch Ordnance Rifle.

Civil War cannon were mounted on carriages made of oak with iron fittings. There were several different sizes of carriages to accommodate each type of cannon. Carriages at the park today are made of cast iron and are made to replicate the look of the old carriages. These were made in a Gettysburg foundry by Calvin Hamilton, a Civil War veteran, between 1895 and 1910.

There were many types and styles of artillery rounds manufactured during the Civil War. Smoothbore guns such as 12-pounder Napoleons and howitzers fired round cannon balls. Elongated or conical-shaped shells were used in rifled cannon. The four basic types of artillery round included SOLID SHOT for use against large infantry formations or opposing artillery, and SHELL which was a hollow iron shell filled with black powder and ignited by a length of paper fuze or a percussion fuze. CASE was similar to a shell- hollow inside and filled with black powder with the addition of iron balls. The fourth type of artillery round was CANISTER, a tin can filled with iron balls and used against infantry and cavalry formations at close range. When fired, canister turned the cannon into a large shotgun.

An artillery shell was affixed to a wooden base and a cloth bag filled with one to two pounds of black powder. The shell was placed into the muzzle of the cannon and rammed into the breech. The bag was pierced with a sharp wire through the vent at the breech and ignited by a friction primer- a copper tube filled with ignition powder & fulminate of mercury. The primer was attached to a lanyard that when pulled, drew a serrated wire through the primer igniting the charge. An efficient gun crew could load and fire up to three rounds per minute. This deadly efficiency was never more evident than on July 3rd during Pickett's Charge. A variety of ammunition was used against the Confederate infantry formations. One solid shot plowed into Company I, 53rd Virginia Infantry knocking out 12 men. As the Confederates swarmed up to the Union positions, Union gunners desperately loaded and fired double charges of cannister into the gray ranks with devastating results. It is no wonder that infantrymen had such high respect, and loathing, for the big guns.

A battery was an intricate organization of men, horses, and ordnance. There were multiple duties for each man to perform when not in battle including care of the horses, gun and carriage maintenance, and routine stock duties. In battle, each man had a specific assignment to serve the gun, though many were cross-trained and could perform other duties when required. One battery in the Union army consisted of six cannon, all of similar type and caliber and each with its own limber and caisson. Teams of six horses were used to pull the limbers and caissons that held ammunition chests containing the different types of shells used in each gun. The gunners walked during the march or trotted alongside the limbers when moving into a position. Only when the situation called for fast movement did they ride on the limbers and caissons when going into battle. Once in position, the gunners would unlimber the cannon and the limber would move to a position directly behind the gun. The caisson team would move to a location behind the limber to await further orders.

Confederate batteries were smaller, composed of only four guns and often of different types and calibers. For example, Captain Charles Fry's Virginia Battery, the "Orange Artillery", had two 3-inch Ordnance Rifles and two 10-pounder Parrott Rifles. Captain Hugh Ross' Georgia Battery had one Napoleon, three Parrott Rifles, and one Naval Parrott Rifle. Due to a scarcity of horse reserves in the south, Confederate batteries were forced to limit their horse teams to only four animals. Mules were used when horses were unavailable, but they were not considered a satisfactory substitute as they were more difficult to control.

In the Army of the Potomac, the artillery was organized by brigades. One brigade was commanded by a major, lt. colonel or colonel though several were commanded by captains, and was composed of four to five batteries. Every corps had one artillery brigade assigned to it for the use of the corps commander. The artillery brigade commander was responsible for posting his batteries and making certain that each was properly serviced and supplied. Two brigades of horse artillery were assigned to the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps. The army also had a well organized Artillery Reserve composed of five brigades. These reserve brigades supplied extra batteries to support the batteries assigned to the infantry corps, and added an extra amount of firepower when and where it was needed.

The Army of Northern Virginia organized its artillery into battalions, each commanded by a major or colonel. One battalion was composed of four batteries and one battalion was assigned to an infantry division. For example, Major William T. Poague's Battalion, assigned to Pender's Division of Hills Corps, was composed of the Albemarle (Virginia) Battery, the Charlotte (North Carolina) Artillery, the Madison (Mississippi) Light Artillery, and Brooke's Virginia Battery. In addition, each of the three army corps had an artillery reserve of two battalions. Despite the larger number of artillery organizations in Army of Northern Virginia, the Union held the advantage in the actual number of guns present during the battle. Many of the Confederate batteries were understrength and missing their total compliment of cannon.